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A Nobel for Practical Economics 
One winner helped us understand the social benefits of mergers, the other how to take 
care of common resources.
by David R. Henderson
The Wall Street Journal, October 12, 2009
Yesterday's award of the Nobel Prize in economics to Elinor Ostrom and Oliver 
Williamson at first struck me as a good choice. Now I think it's a great choice. 
The reason is that mainstream economics has become highly mathematical and 
increasingly independent from reality. Many economists sit in their offices and 
derive proofs. Few go out and do the time-consuming work of examining 
the institutional structures that humans build to solve their own real-
world problems. Among those few are Ms. Ostrom and Mr. Williamson.
Both draw on rich data from outside the field of economics. Ms. Ostrom draws 
much of hers from case studies of common-property resources and Mr. 
Williamson from business historians such as the late Alfred Chandler. Some have 
summarized their work by saying that institutions other than free markets often 
work well. But that statement can mislead you to conclude that government 
solutions are the answer. Free markets are only a subset of free institutions. 
A better way to sum up their work is that what Ms. Ostrom and Mr. 
Willamson really show is that voluntary associations work.
Consider Mr. Williamson's work. Drawing on 1991 Nobel laureate Ronald 
Coase's work on why firms exist, Mr. Williamson showed that these voluntary 
institutions exist to solve problems that arms-length market transactions have 
trouble solving.
Take, for example, a coal mine that depends on a railroad line to ship its coal. 
Before the mine owner develops the mine, he wants to be assured that the 
railroad owner won't charge him a monopoly price. Before the potential railroad 
owner builds the spur, he wants to be sure that the coal mine owner, his only 
customer, won't try to skin him by paying a price below the amount that would 
compensate him for the high fixed cost of the railroad. Solution: vertically 
integrate. Have the railroad owner also be the mine owner and you solve 
the problem.
Prior to Mr. Williamson's work, many legal scholars and economists had seen 
vertical integration as a way to acquire market power. This argument made little 
sense, as antitrust scholars Robert Bork and the late Ward Bowman pointed out, 
because it's hard to multiply market power using vertical integration. As the 
Nobel committee noted, Mr. Williamson's work led to less concern that vertical 
integration enhances market power and this has caused judges and antitrust 
officials to be less hostile to vertical integration.
Although the Nobel committee did not highlight Mr. Williamson's classic 1968 
article, "Economies as an Antitrust Defense," I will. Mr. Williamson showed that 
horizontal mergers of companies in the same industry—even those that increase 
market power and even those where the increase in market power leads to a 
higher price—can create efficiency. The reason is that if mergers reduce costs, the 
reduction in costs can create more gains for the economy than the losses to 
consumers from the higher price.
How about Ms. Ostrom's work? Most economists are familiar with the late 
Garrett Hardin's classic article, "The Tragedy of the Commons." His idea was that 
when no one owns a resource, it is overused because no one can control its usage 
and each person has an incentive to use it before others do. This insight has 
helped us understand much human behavior and has led people to advocate 
either having the resource privately owned or having it controlled by 
government.
Not so fast, said Ms. Ostrom. Examining dozens of case studies, she found cases 
of communal ownership that worked—that is, that didn't lead to the tragic 
outcomes envisioned by Hardin—as well as ones that didn't. Were there 
systematic differences? Yes, and interestingly the ones that worked did have a 
kind of property rights system, just not private ownership.
Based on her work, Ms. Ostrom proposed several rules for managing common-
pool resources, which the Nobel committee highlights. Among them are that 
rules should clearly define who gets what, good conflict resolution methods 
should be in place, people's duty to maintain the resource should be proportional 
to their benefits, monitoring and punishing is done by the users or someone 
accountable to the users, and users are allowed to participate in setting and 
modifying the rules. Notice the absence of top-down government solutions. In 
her work on development economics, Ms. Ostrom concludes that top-down 
solutions don't help poor countries. Are you listening, World Bank?
In a 2006 article with Harini Nagendra, Ms. Ostrom wrote: "We conclude that 
simple formulas focusing on formal ownership, particularly one based solely on 
public [government] ownership of forest lands, will not solve the problem of 
resource use." Garth Owen-Smith, who helped solve the common-resource 
problem of elephants in Namibia by ensuring that local residents shared in the 
financial benefits from tourism and trophy hunting, drew explicitly on Ms. 
Ostrom's work. If locals benefit from having a resident population of elephants, 
they are much less likely to poach and more likely to stop other poachers.
Economists talking about real humans and not mathematical abstractions and 
winning the Nobel prize for it? Good on ya, Nobel committee.
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